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A B S T R A C T
In recent years, an overly narrow focus on rebound eﬀects has limited the extent of researcher and policy
attention aﬀorded to the wider multiple beneﬁts of increased energy eﬃciency. Our objective is to focus policy
attention on the sustained added value to the economy that is created by improving energy eﬃciency in the
residential sector. Governments around the world are committed to increasing energy eﬃciency more generally,
but often focus public support in low income households where energy poverty is a particular concern. However,
governments operate in a context of multiple objectives where energy eﬃciency is expected to deliver signiﬁcant
reductions in carbon emissions alongside sustainable economic development. We use a UK CGE model to con-
sider the general eﬀects of supporting increases in energy eﬃciency in residential energy use. Our results de-
monstrate that the increase in GDP, and economic activity more generally, triggered by increased energy eﬃ-
ciency delivers more in terms of increased household incomes than the eﬃciency improvement itself. We ﬁnd
that the more wide ranging the boost to energy eﬃciency, the greater the economic expansion and associated
returns are likely to be, and the less the means of ﬁnancing through public budgets will erode the beneﬁts over
time.
1. Introduction
In recent years the literature on the wider economic impacts of
energy eﬃciency improvements has tended to focus on the issue of
rebound eﬀects. In particular, rebound studies have mainly focussed on
measuring direct and indirect (‘re-spending’) rebound eﬀects using
microeconomic or limited input-output economy-wide models (see for
example Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Druckman et al., 2011; Freire-
Gonzáles, 2011). Where diﬀerent household income groups are iden-
tiﬁed, emphasis has tended to be placed on how rebound eﬀects that are
driven by changes in real income following an energy eﬃciency im-
provement will be bigger the larger the share of total income that is
spent on energy consumption (Chitnis et al., 2014; Murray, 2013;
Thomas and Azevedo, 2013).
However, certainly in colder climates like that of the UK, where
lower income households tend to spend a larger share of their income
on energy (Oﬃce for National Statistics, 2011, 2012, 2013), there are
concerns over energy or fuel poverty (UK DECC, 2015).1 This both
raises a challenge for the rebound-focussed literature, in that direct
rebound eﬀects triggered by lower energy costs may in fact be a true
representation of required demand (to adequately heat properties), and
focuses attention on the nature of socio-economic returns from in-
creased energy eﬃciency.
The latter point reﬂects the ‘multiple beneﬁts of energy eﬃciency’
argument proposed by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014;
Ryan and Campbell, 2012). In particular the current paper focuses at-
tention on the sustained added value to the economy that is created as
result of increasing energy eﬃciency. We consider this in the context of
a general equilibrium argument. That is, we propose that the increase in
GDP and economic activity more generally that is triggered by in-
creased energy eﬃciency (here in the household sector) delivers more
in terms of energy poverty reduction than the eﬃciency improvement
itself.2 This is through the additional return to household incomes as
the economy expands. The larger and more wide-ranging the boost to
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1 In warmer climates, cooling may be a greater concern than heating. However, the expense of running air conditioning systems may deter low income households from investing in
systems, so that expenditure on cooling does not manifest in economic statistics in the same way as energy poverty linked to heating.
2 Note that in this paper we do not attempt to investigate impacts on precise measures of energy or fuel poverty currently adopted in the UK. At this stage, in our general analysis, we
focus simply on whether the share of disposable income spent on energy goes up or down, given that a commonly adopted fuel poverty indicator compares the share of income spent on
energy to a given threshold.
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household energy eﬃciency, the greater the economic expansion and
associated returns are likely to be.
We also consider a government funding argument, that public
support should be directed at helping those less able to pay for energy
eﬃciency improvements themselves. Speciﬁcally, we consider whether
economic expansion triggered by more wide ranging support of energy
eﬃciency programmes is likely to provide suﬃcient stimulus to the
economy to justify greater levels of public support. This may also
provide the basis for setting energy eﬃciency programmes in the con-
text of a national infrastructure argument linked to improving the
quality of a country's domestic building stock.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 re-
views the recent indirect and economy-wide rebound literature that has
been the recent setting for considering the impacts of increased eﬃ-
ciency in household energy use. We focus on the extent to which wider
economic expansionary and socio-economic arguments have been
made. Section 3 then focuses attention on the policy context for iden-
tifying the issues outlined above, expanding on the multiple beneﬁts,
general equilibrium and public funding/national infrastructure argu-
ments. Section 4 describes the UK CGE model that we use to consider
the general eﬀects that may be anticipated if energy eﬃciency increases
in one or more household income groups in an economy. Section 5
details the simulation scenarios that are then implemented in Section 6,
where we discuss our results. Finally, Section 7 draws conclusions and
considers policy implications.
2. Existing literature on the wider impacts of energy eﬃciency
In recent years a number of studies have analysed the impact of
improved household energy eﬃciency using microeconomic demand
systems, and input-output (IO) techniques. Their main focus has been
the estimation of direct and indirect rebound eﬀects (see for example
Brännlund et al., 2007; Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Druckman et al.,
2011; Freire-Gonzáles, 2011; Lenzen and Dey, 2002; Mizobuchi, 2008).
More broadly, the main objective of this literature is to assess the
eﬀectiveness of energy eﬃciency, speciﬁcally in reducing energy use
and CO2 emissions throughout the economy triggered by a reduction in
ﬁnal energy demand. For this reason, they estimate the rebound eﬀect
as a measure of the extent to which technically possible energy savings
are eroded by economic responses.
Some of these studies have estimated energy rebound eﬀects by
considering the impacts of energy eﬃciency and energy saving beha-
vioural changes across diﬀerent household income groups (Chitnis
et al., 2014; Murray, 2013; Thomas and Azevedo, 2013). In this context,
a common ﬁnding is that the lowest income groups tend to be asso-
ciated with higher rebound eﬀects. This is for two reasons. First, lower
income groups tend to spend a larger share of their income on energy.
Second, the price elasticity of demand for energy goods is generally
higher when income is lower, indicating that lower income households
are more responsive to changes in energy price (Chitnis et al., 2014).
When the price of energy in eﬃciency units decreases, price elastic
groups respond by consuming more energy.
However, a key limitation of the approaches adopted in the afore-
mentioned studies is to rely on models that implicitly or explicitly adopt
the assumption of ﬁxed market prices and nominal incomes. Such
models are not able to capture the full set of economic responses trig-
gered by an energy eﬃciency improvement that will occur as the
economy adjusts to a new steady state with diﬀerent spending and
production decisions. Thus, they are limited in their capability to
identify other potential beneﬁts of energy eﬃciency (Brännlund et al.,
2007; Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015; Lecca et al., 2014).
Duarte et al. (2015), and Lecca et al. (2014) have estimated the
impact of improving energy eﬃciency in household energy use using
more ﬂexible computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that in-
corporate IO data but permit the relaxation of the assumptions inherent
in partial equilibrium and IO studies. Speciﬁcally, Lecca et al. (2014)
take the case of the UK and explore the value added of moving from a
partial to a general equilibrium modelling framework (via an inter-
mediate stage involving IO analysis) in the analysis of energy eﬃciency
improvement. This is done by considering the impact of a 5% increase
in household energy eﬃciency using models with diﬀerent degrees of
complexity calibrated on a common database.
Lecca et al. (2014) initially estimate the direct rebound eﬀect by
estimating the elasticity of demand for energy goods and then derive
the indirect (re-spending) rebound eﬀects using IO techniques. They
ﬁnd that the indirect component of rebound is typically negative3 when
the direct rebound is less than 100% and the economy is characterised
by energy sectors that are relatively energy intensive. In their UK case
study, households decrease their demand for energy and reallocate
spending towards less energy intensive non-energy goods, thereby re-
ducing both direct energy use and energy embodied in supply chains
supporting consumption demand. These net negative indirect eﬀects
persist when Lecca et al. (2014) derive the full economy-wide rebound
using a CGE model. However, here the fuller economy-wide responses
to the energy eﬃciency improvement are inﬂuenced by endogenous
market price determination, nominal income and supply responses.
This implies, for example, that the initial drop in demand for energy
decreases the market price of energy in the short-run, exacerbating the
rebound eﬀect by amplifying the decrease in the price of energy ser-
vices (for any given market price), which may be considered as the
eﬀective price of energy. However, it also negatively inﬂuences the
revenue and capacity decisions of energy producing ﬁrms and, over
time, their output prices (i.e. countering decreases in both the eﬀective
and market price of energy). Moreover, the increase in demand for non-
energy goods puts upward pressure on domestic consumption prices,
negatively inﬂuencing competitiveness of UK industries. Nonetheless,
overall the Lecca et al. (2014) results show a net expansion in the UK
economy, with an increase in investment, employment and household
spending. However, with a ﬁxed national labour supply, depending on
how households respond to the change in cost of living given by in-
creased energy eﬃciency, a sustained increase in wages may give rise to
a higher price level and reduced export demand.
The Lecca et al. (2014) contribution helps to clarify the importance
of analysing the full general equilibrium impacts of increased house-
hold energy eﬃciency. However, it is limited in only considering one
single representative household, thereby not permitting any diﬀer-
entiation among household income groups. However, diﬀerences in the
composition of both incomes and expenditures are likely to be crucial in
inﬂuencing the distribution of the eﬀects of economic adjustment across
household income groups. Here, heterogeneity of households proves to
be very important from a policy perspective.
Duarte et al. (2015) also use a CGE model, this time for Spain to
assess a range of energy-saving policies including increasing energy
eﬃciency, but identifying four household income groups. They actually
ﬁnd that lower income household are less responsive to an energy ef-
ﬁciency improvement, and indeed are associated with lower rebound
eﬀects.4 However, the main point is that (although the focus of the
work is on potential reduction of CO2 emissions) Duarte et al.’s (2015)
results also show that an energy eﬃciency improvement delivers an
economic stimulus with a broader set of outcomes than reducing energy
use.
In general, though, much of the rebound literature neglects the
wider range of potential economic beneﬁts associated with increased
energy eﬃciency that have been the focus of policy community con-
tributions such as the IEA (2014) report. In response, this paper aims to
add to the energy eﬃciency and CGE literature in ﬁlling this gap by
3 This means that actual energy savings from an energy eﬃciency improvement are
greater than expected energy savings.
4 This may relate to the issue of cooling vs. heating and that in warmer climates, such
as Spain, low income households cannot aﬀord more electricity-intensive systems such as
air conditioning.
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exploring the wider impacts of household energy eﬃciency improve-
ments, and to do so with speciﬁc focus on identifying diﬀerent impacts
among household income groups. In particular we focus on how sup-
port of energy eﬃciency programmes in the household sector may be
justiﬁed through consequential macroeconomic expansion.
3. Broadening focus for a ‘multiple objectives’ policy context
If we broaden focus from estimating rebound eﬀects of increased
energy eﬃciency more carefully to consider the processes that drive
them, we implicitly turn attention to what has become known as the
multiple beneﬁts argument. While this speciﬁc terminology originates
with Ryan and Campbell (2012) and the IEA (2014), arguments and
evidence that energy eﬃciency will enhance economic welfare in a
range of ways, including as a result of macroeconomic expansion, have
been considered in other studies, notably (in terms of reﬂecting on the
recent dominant focus on rebound eﬀects) in the recent contribution by
Gillingham et al. (2016).5
In the current paper, we build on previous CGE studies of increased
household energy eﬃciency to consider the wider economic impacts
that fall under the multiple beneﬁts umbrella. In particular, we focus on
a general equilibrium argument that economic expansion will poten-
tially deliver more in terms of individual household economic well-
being than the initial improvement in energy eﬃciency. That is, when
the economy expands (through increased investment, employment and
output) as a result of increased and reallocated real household
spending, increased incomes from employment of labour and capital
services will further boost household incomes.6 In an energy poverty
context, while the expansionary process will trigger further rebound in
household use (as well as in the production sector of the economy), this
must be set against increased household incomes (and beneﬁts).
Thus, one implication of this general equilibrium argument is that
improvements in residential energy eﬃciency will deliver more than a
simple reduction in energy use (and related carbon emissions). Rather,
by stimulating economic expansionary processes, it will further boost
incomes throughout the economy and potentially deliver beneﬁts that
would justify the public support required to allow the eﬃciency im-
provement to occur. Of course, the greater economic expansion may
limit the eﬀectiveness of energy eﬃciency improvements to reduce
ﬁnal energy use, generating a trade-oﬀ between achieved energy sav-
ings and economic stimulus. Nonetheless, in the absence of backﬁre
(> 100% rebound), energy eﬃciency improvements will still deliver on
both reducing energy use and stimulating the economy.
However, it may be argued that macroeconomic expansion can be
delivered through other policies and that, where energy eﬃciency
policy requires the support of the public purse, focus should be on
helping those households who are currently unable to heat7 their homes
suﬃciently. While the general equilibrium argument above implies that
the more wide-ranging the energy eﬃciency improvement, the greater
will be the beneﬁt to all households, it is necessary to consider whether
restrictions on the government budget may erode the multiple beneﬁts.
That is, a government funding argument must also be considered. In the
UK analysis below, we consider the context of a government that re-
quires to maintain a ﬁxed public sector deﬁcit so that any support for
energy eﬃciency programmes must be of a balanced-budget nature.
That is to say that the funding for such programmes must come either
from a reallocation of existing public spending or a change in tax rev-
enues, at least in the short-term (until the costs of introducing the ef-
ﬁciency improvement have been recovered).
The key issue, then, is whether the resulting expansion is still large
enough to compensate for the impacts of falling government ex-
penditure (in the areas where spending is reduced) or the distortions
triggered by increasing tax rates in part(s) of the economy. In turn, this
is again likely to depend on how extensive the eﬃciency improvement
is and what type and level of spending activity (the trigger for demand-
led expansion) occurs as a result of freed up (and increased) household
(real) disposable incomes. If the eﬃciency improvement is limited to
low income households, it must be recognised that these households are
(a) a more limited source of spending power, and (b) less sensitive to
the wage and capital incomes generated by economic expansion, given
their greater dependence upon publicly funded beneﬁts. Stimulating
higher income households, on the other hand, may free up much more
spending on non-energy goods and services and deliver greater beneﬁts
through increased wage and capital incomes.8
This latter point may ultimately support a national infrastructure
argument. If it can be shown that the economic stimulus generated by
support of wider-ranging energy eﬃciency programmes is likely to
deliver suﬃcient economy stimulus to justify the initial levels of
funding required, then arguments for strategic investment in energy
eﬃciency can be more solidly made. On this basis, the type of quite
generalised analysis we oﬀer below is intended as a ﬁrst step in im-
pacting policy discussion around focussing attention on the broader
value added/beneﬁts of, for example, making buildings more energy
eﬃcient.
4. Model and data
We simulate the economy-wide and macroeconomic impacts of
improving household energy eﬃciency using a variant of the UK CGE
model UK-ENVI.9 For the speciﬁc application in this paper, we assume
that investments are made by proﬁt maximising forward-looking agents
while (here ﬁve) representative households (distinguished as income
quintile groups) are myopic. This is intended to capture the notion that
consumers do not behave “as if” they are all rational economic actors,
as is often assumed by economic modellers. In particular, households
tend to be rather myopic, in contrast to ﬁrms, and base their spending
decisions more on current income availability rather than on future
discounted utility of consumption.10 In the following sections we pro-
vide a description of the main characteristics of the model.11
4.1. Consumption
We model the consumption decision of ﬁve representative house-
holds h as follows:
∑= ∙ − − + ∙⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ + −C SHL τ L u w SHK rk K Trf S((1 ) (1 ) )h t h t t
s
t t h
i
i t i t t h t, , , ,
(1)
5 Chan and Gillingham (2015) also provide an analytical exposition of how rebound
eﬀects will have positive economic welfare implications at the microeconomic level.
6 As we show in the CGE simulations reported in Section 6, where there is any con-
straint on the supply-side of the economy (e.g. restricted national labour supply) a de-
mand-led expansion will put upward pressure on prices and potentially damage compe-
titiveness. While this may beneﬁt household incomes through higher wage rates, any loss
in competitiveness will limit the extent of economic expansion over time. Where the
expansion is triggered by increased energy eﬃciency this may be mitigated if households
reﬂect the change in their cost of living in wage demands. However, we do not explore
this issue at this stage.
7 Or, in the context of warmer climates, to cool.
8 Of course, in practice diﬀerences in propensities to consume and potential for further
improvement in what may already be relatively energy eﬃcient higher income homes
(where eﬃciency in the use of luxury appliances may be a greater issue than heating/
insulation) would have to be considered in any practical case study.
9 UK-ENVI is a CGE modelling framework designed for the analysis of economic dis-
turbances to the UK economy. The ENVI version is dedicated to the analysis of energy and
environmental policies.
10 It could be argued that lower income households are more myopic than higher in-
come households. Although this is a reasonable observation, we decide to assume the
same behaviour for all households given that a) we focus our attention on lower income
households and b) long-run results are identical, regardless of the chosen dynamics.
11We provide the full mathematical description of the model in Appendix C supple-
mentary material.
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Household income includes the share of labour (SHL) and capital
(SHK) incomes produced within the economy that goes to households,
and transfers from other institutions (Trf) such as the UK Government,
which are ﬁxed in real terms. In (1) τt is the income tax rate,
12 Ls, is
labour supply, w, is nominal wage, K is capital supply, rk is the capital
rental rate and S are savings.
At each period in time, each household allocates its consumption
between energy used for residential purposes, EC, and non-energy and
transport goods and services (including fuel use in personal transpor-
tation), TNEC, according to the following constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) function:
= ⎡
⎣
+ − ⎤
⎦
− − − −
C δ γEC δ TNEC( ) (1 )h t h
E
h t
ε
ε
h
E
h t
ε
ε
ε
ε
, ,
1
,
1 1h
h
h
h
h
h
(2)
In (2) ε is the elasticity of substitution in consumption, and mea-
sures the extent to which consumers substitute residential energy con-
sumption, EC, for non-energy and transport consumption, TNEC, δ ϵ
(0,1) is the share parameter, and γ is the eﬃciency parameter for re-
sidential energy consumption. For simplicity (and in the absence of
better information), in all households we impose a value, 0.61, for ε
that is the long-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-
energy estimated by Lecca et al. (2014).13 The consumption of re-
sidential energy includes electricity, gas and coal, as shown in Fig. 1,
although the share of coal consumed by households represents less than
0.01% of total energy consumption. Within the energy bundle, given
that we do not focus on inter-fuel substitution in the analysis below, we
impose a small but positive elasticity.
4.2. Production and investment
The production structure is characterised by a capital, labour, en-
ergy and materials (KLEM) nested CES function. As we show in Fig. 2,
the combination of labour and capital forms value added, while energy
and materials form intermediate inputs. In turn, the combination of
intermediate and value added forms total output in each sector.
Following Hayashi (1982), we derive the optimal time path of in-
vestment by maximising the value of ﬁrms Vt , subject to a capital ac-
cumulation function K̇t , so that:
∑ ⎛
⎝ +
⎞
⎠
− + = −
=
∞
MaxV
r
pi I g x subjecttoK I δK
1
1
[ (1 ( ))] ̇t
t
t
t t t t t t
0 (3)
In (3), pit , is the ﬁrm's proﬁt, It , is private investment, g x( )t is the
adjustment cost function with =x I K/t t t and δ is depreciation rate. The
solution of the optimisation problem gives us the law of motion of the
shadow price of capital, λt, and the adjusted Tobin's q time path of
investment (Hayashi, 1982).
4.3. The labour market
Wages are determined within the UK in an imperfect competition
setting, according to the following wage curve:
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
= −w
cpi
φ uln ϵ ln( )t
b
t
t
(4)
where
=
+
w
w
τ1
t
b t
t
where the real consumption (after tax) wage is negatively related to the
rate of unemployment (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2009). In (4),
w
cpi
t
b
t
is
the real take home wage, φ is a parameter calibrated to the steady state,
ϵ is the elasticity of wage related to the level of unemployment ut . The
working population is assumed to be ﬁxed and exogenous.
4.4. Government
The Government collects taxes and spends the revenue on a range of
economic activities. The aggregate ﬁscal deﬁcit is taken to be ﬁxed, so
that any changes are constrained to be balanced budget in nature. The
given ﬁscal deﬁcit (FD) is maintained constant by either adjusting
taxation or expenditure as illustrated in Eq. (5):
= −FD GY GEXPt t t
where
∑ ∑ ∑= ⎛
⎝
⎜ ∙ ∙ + + ∙ ∙ + ∙
⎞
⎠
⎟GY d rk K IBT τ L w FE εt
g
i
i t i t
i
i t t
j
j t t t, , , ,
(5)
∑= ∙ + ∙GEXP G Pg TRG Pct t t
dngins
dngins t t,
In (5) FD is equal to the diﬀerence between government income, GY,
and government spending, GEXP. In turn, GY is the sum of the share dg
of capital revenue that is transferred to the Government, indirect
business taxes, IBT, revenues from labour income, L, at the rate τ,14 and
foreign remittances FE times the ﬁxed exchange rate ԑ. GEXP includes
government spending on goods and services plus transfers (TRG) to
other non-governmental domestic institutions (dngins), which are ﬁxed
in real terms. The ﬁscal surplus/ deﬁcit is ﬁxed throughout the analysis.
We initially assume that the Government absorbs the budgetary
impacts of any change in the economy by adjusting expenditure and
keeping household income tax rates ﬁxed. However, as explained
below, we explore other cases, including where the Government ﬁxes
its expenditure and adjusts the income tax rate.
Fig. 1. The structure of consumption.
Fig. 2. The structure of production.
12 The income tax rate is ﬁxed by default in our model. However, in Sections 5 and 6
we explain how this can be changed endogenously to absorb the cost of energy eﬃciency
enhancing policies.
13 However, we have conducted sensitivity analysis where we introduce diﬀerent va-
lues for diﬀerent household income groups. In particular, we introduced higher values for
lower household income groups and vice versa. In comparison to the results reported in
Section 4, we ﬁnd that a higher elasticity triggers a larger rebound eﬀect overall and in
the households with higher elasticity. While the impact on overall GDP is not much
changed (slightly reduced in the short run), as may be expected, there is a larger boost to
disposable income in those groups with a higher elasticity, while the share of income
spent on energy falls by less. 14Which is the same as the one in Eqs. (1) and (4).
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4.5. Dataset: income disaggregation and energy use
We calibrate the UK-ENVI CGE model on the UK Social Accounting
Matrix for 2010.15 The data has 30 diﬀerent productive sectors16 in-
cluding 4 main energy supply industries that encompass the supply of
coal, reﬁned oil, gas and electricity. We identify UK households, the UK
Government, imports, exports and transfers to and from the rest of the
World (ROW).
As noted above (and explained in Appendix B supplementary ma-
terial), we disaggregate the household sector into 5 household income
quintiles (HG), using the UK Living Costs and Food Survey. The income
bands are described and related to weekly gross incomes in Table 1.
Table 2 shows residential energy spending (on electricity, gas and
coal) for each household as a percentage of total energy consumption
and of total consumption spending, and in absolute values expressed in
£ million.
As would be expected for a country with a colder climate like the
UK, lower income household groups spend a greater share of their
budget on energy. Moreover, the energy expenditure is mostly for re-
sidential (heating and lighting) use. As income increases, the share of
energy in total expenditure decreases, and spending on fuels for
transport increases. However, in absolute terms higher income house-
holds spend more on residential energy than lower income households
do.
5. Simulation scenarios
As explained above (Section 3), the aim of the simulations in this
paper is to consider the general eﬀects of delivering increased energy
eﬃciency in diﬀerent household income groups. For this reason, we
focus on specifying and explaining simple and transparent scenarios,
rather than attempting to detail and conduct simulations of particular
policy options. We derive the impact of an illustrative 10% improve-
ment in household residential energy use by exploring three main
Scenarios. Each scenario is divided into two sub-scenarios: ﬁrst, a,
where we assume that the energy eﬃciency improvement occurs in all
households, regardless of their income; then, b, where we assume that
eﬃciency improves only in the energy use of the lowest income quintile
household. From above, the latter case is identiﬁed as a priority focus
for public spending where energy poverty is an issue of policy concern.
In Scenario 1 we explore the impact of a 10% costless (and exo-
genously determined) improvement in household residential energy
eﬃciency. This builds on the work of Lecca et al. (2014), extending that
analysis to explore how the implications of the eﬃciency enhancement
diﬀer across the ﬁve income quintiles, and focussing only on energy
used for heating and lighting (i.e. excluding reﬁned fuel used in per-
sonal transportation).
In Scenarios 2 and 3 we consider in broad terms diﬀerent options for
how Government may fund the increase in energy eﬃciency. Given that
we do not have information about the likely cost of increasing house-
hold energy eﬃciency by 10% in UK, we simplify by assuming that the
Government compensates for the diﬀerence in household energy ex-
penditure before and after the eﬃciency increase, for a limited time
period (5 years). This is done by including this in the expenditure items
of its own budget, as shown in Eq. (6).
= − + ∆FD GY GEXP γECt t t t (6)
In order to keep the budget balanced when ∆γ EC17 is negative (for
example when energy eﬃciency increases and there is a net reduction
in energy use), the Government can either reduce its current ex-
penditure, G, or increase its income, GY by raising the income tax rate τ
and holding the expenditure ﬁxed. In this case, the variation in τ would
aﬀect the households’ budged constraint, Eq. (1), the real after tax
wage, Eq. (4), and the ﬁscal deﬁcit Eq. (5). In the sixth period (year)
after the eﬃciency improvement, we consider that it has been com-
pletely paid for and Eq. (6) is replaced by its standard version described
in (5).18 This approach is not intended to provide an exact measure of
the cost of improving eﬃciency, rather it allows us to consider how
eﬃciency can be funded by the Government using diﬀerent options,
and what the likely impacts are.
Following this approach, in Scenario 2 we assume that a 10%
household energy eﬃciency enhancement is funded via a temporary
reallocation of Government spending. This eﬀectively means that for
ﬁve years the Government has to decrease its expenditure on other
goods and services in order to spend on energy eﬃciency, while en-
suring that the government balance is maintained in each period.
Because we do not have any prior expectation of where the Government
may reallocate its expenditure, we assume that changes in aggregate
spending are redistributed proportionately among sectors according to
the baseline shares.
In Scenario 3 we assume that a 10% household energy eﬃciency
improvement is funded through a temporary rise in the income tax rate,
τ. This implies that the Government is able to hold its current spending
constant while balancing the budget through additional revenue. The
focus on income tax is motivated in terms of the energy eﬃciency
improvement being beneﬁcial to households so that paying through tax
provides an indirect way of having the household sector as a whole pay
for increased eﬃciency in dwellings. However, there are distributional
implications because higher income households pay more tax.
Moreover, where only the lowest income household beneﬁts from the
energy eﬃciency improvement, the implication is that this is largely
paid for by other households. In terms of the impacts on any economic
expansion, introducing a change in income tax has important implica-
tions. This is because it triggers a change in supply side behaviour
through the wage bargaining process, given that the after-tax or take-
home wage, which is the focus of the bargaining process, is directly
impacted (see Eq. (4)).
Table 1
Quintiles disaggregation in the 2010 UK SAM by weekly income.
HG1 HG2 HG3 HG4 HG5
Up to £237 £238 - £412 £413 - £650 £651 - £1014 £1015 and over
Table 2
Percentage of energy used for domestic purposes in total energy consumption and in total
consumption.
HG1 HG2 HG5 HG4 HG5
Res. energy/
Tot. energy 89.6% 85.2% 81.4% 76.2% 69.9%
Res. energy/
Tot. consumption 6.7% 5.5% 4.5% 3.8% 2.6%
Res. energy £ million 5014 6889 7535 7692 8325
15 The SAM is produced by the Fraser of Allander Institute and available for download
at: http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/fraserofallanderinstitute/research/
economicmodelling/.
16 See Appendix A supplementary material, Table A.1 for the full list of sectors and the
corresponding sectors in the 2010 UK IO table.
17 Recall that from Eq. (2) EC is residential energy consumed by households and γ is a
parameter representing energy eﬃciency.
18 Again, we note that this is a simplifying assumption (and, unless the change in
expenditure or tax is permanent, the number of periods assumed does not qualitatively
impact our results below).
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6. Results
6.1. Costless improvement in household energy eﬃciency
The results are organised in two tables. Table 3 shows the short and
long-run impacts on key macroeconomic and energy use variables of a
costless 10% increase in UK household energy eﬃciency for the two
sub-scenarios: a, where the energy eﬃciency improvement occurs in all
households (All HG); b. where eﬃciency improves only in the energy
use of the lowest income quintile households (HG1). Table 4 reports
percentage change in key components of households’ consumption
disaggregated by income quintiles for the two sub-scenarios 1a and 1b.
We report the results as percentage changes from the base year
(SAM 2010) values, with the short-run results referring to the ﬁrst
period (year) after the energy eﬃciency improvement takes place and
the long-run referring to a conceptual time period where the capital
stock is fully adjusted to a new steady-state equilibrium. Remember
from Section 4 that we assume a ﬁxed national labour supply, with a
pool of unemployed labour and wage bargaining where there is a ne-
gative relationship between the unemployment rate and real after tax
wage.
6.1.1. Scenario 1a: 10% eﬃciency improvement in residential energy used
by all household groups
The ﬁrst column in Table 3 shows that in the short run the switch in
household expenditure away from spending on energy for heating and
lighting towards other types of consumption has a small expansionary
impact on the economy. Total GDP, consumption (disposable income
after savings), employment, and investment increase by 0.03%, 0.52%,
0.05% and 1.14% respectively. As the sectors involved (directly or in-
directly) in supplying goods and services where demand has increased
expand (oﬀ-set by contractions in energy supply chains), there is a
corresponding stimulus to labour demand. This causes the unemploy-
ment rate to decrease by 0.82% while the nominal wage increases by
0.42%, which, with a CPI increase of 0.32%, equates to the 0.09% in-
crease in the real wage. However, the increase in the CPI does lead to a
decrease in total export demand of 0.49% while imports increase by
0.7%.
Total household residential energy consumption falls by 2.35%,
which, taking into account how a full range of economy-wide adjust-
ments impact household income and consumption, is a large (76.5%)
rebound on the 10% potential energy savings. That total household
energy rebound is higher reﬂects increased spending on reﬁned fuels for
personal transportation. However, that the full economy-wide
rebound19 is proportionately smaller (just under 69.9%) reﬂects that
there is a net decrease in energy use on the production side of the
economy (due to the contraction in energy supply activity).
The long-run results for Scenario 1a, reported in the second column
in Table 3, show household energy use remaining below its base-year
value. That rebound eﬀects are smaller in the long-run than in the
short-run reﬂects the impact of ‘disinvestment’ (Turner, 2009), or
contraction in capacity, in energy supply on energy prices and con-
sumption and production choices. There is a further (less energy-in-
tensive) expansion in GDP, with a long run increase of 0.16%. The
expansion in the long run is greater than in the short run because the
ability for all production sectors to adjust capacity allows a greater
response to the net positive demand stimulus from increase real
household income reallocated to other goods and services.
The top panel of Table 4 reports results disaggregated by income
quintiles for Scenario 1a. Recall that in Table 1, Section 4.3, we show
that lower income households spend a higher share of their income on
residential energy. When energy eﬃciency improves, these more en-
ergy intensive household groups tend to reduce their energy demand by
a smaller proportion (i.e. they rebound more). For example, in the long-
run HG1 reduces residential energy consumption by 2.31%, HG3 by
2.61% and HG5 by 2.86%.20 These correspond to an absolute change of
£116 million, £197 million, and £238 respectively. Additionally, be-
cause a larger portion of their consumption improves in eﬃciency,
lower income households are also associated with a larger propor-
tionate change in total consumption. For instance, that the long run
percentage change in disposable income associated with HG1 is 70%,
while it is 60% for HG3 and 52% for HG5. However, baseline ex-
penditure values for higher income households are greater than those
for lower income households. For this reason, in the same groups,
disposable income increases in absolute terms by £ 0.5 million, £1
million or £1.7 million respectively.
6.1.2. Scenario 1b. 10% increase in residential energy used by the lowest
income quintile household group
The long-run results, fourth column of Table 3, are qualitatively the
same as found in Scenario 1a, but the scale of both the economic ex-
pansion and the contraction in total household energy use is much
smaller. However, In the short-run, third column of Table 3, crowding
out eﬀects impacting exports and disinvestment in the energy supply
sectors actually causes a very small net negative impact in GDP
(−0.001%).21 The core issue is that the lowest income quintile, where
spending power is directly boosted by the energy eﬃciency improve-
ment, is only a very small source of consumption expenditure in the UK
economy. This group is also not a huge beneﬁciary of increased labour
and capital income when the expansion occurs. This means that further
induced ‘multiplier’ rounds of spending come largely from the other
household income groups, and this is limited in the very small expan-
sion reported.22
Indeed if we refer to the long-run results for the change in house-
hold disposable income net of savings (i.e. consumption spending) in
Table 4, scenarios 1a and 1b, we note that around 85% of the increase
enjoyed by HG1 when energy eﬃciency improves in all households is
retained in the case where only HG1 Increases its eﬃciency. On the
Table 3
Percentage change in key macroeconomic variables from a 10% costless increase in
household residential energy eﬃciency.
Scenario 1a Scenario 1b
SR LR SR LR
GDP 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.02
CPI 0.32 0.21 0.03 0.01
Investment 1.14 0.79 0.15 0.11
Unemployment rate −0.82 −2.08 0.04 −0.13
Employment 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.01
Nominal wage 0.42 0.45 0.02 0.03
Import 0.70 0.58 0.07 0.05
Export −0.49 −0.37 −0.04 −0.02
Total energy use −0.67 −0.89 −0.09 −0.11
Disposable income (excluding savings) 0.52 0.58 0.06 0.07
Household total energy consumption −1.66 −1.87 −0.22 −0.24
Residential energy consumption −2.35 −2.62 −0.30 −0.33
Household rebound in res. energy 76.53 73.82 79.03 76.71
Household rebound in total energy 78.89 76.33 80.65 78.50
Economy wide rebound 69.86 59.68 71.94 63.91
19 Details of rebound calculations are reported in Appendix D supplementary material.
20 This conﬁrms, in a general equilibrium setting, microeconomic ﬁndings by Chitnis
et al. (2014) whereby UK lower income households are associated with higher rebound
eﬀect.
21 However, sensitivity analysis shows that if the proportionate increase in energy
eﬃciency is larger, here 14%, this is suﬃcient to make the short-run increase in GDP
slightly positive (0.003%, but with the long-run impact, although very slightly larger,
remaining the same correct to the two decimal places reported in Table 3).
22We have run alternative simulations where the other income quintiles are in turn
each the recipients of the energy eﬃciency increase. In all other cases the positive sti-
mulus from their boosted and reallocated spending is suﬃcient to generate a positive
expansion from the outset. These results are reported in Figus et al. (2016).
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other hand, comparison of the GDP results in the second and fourth
columns of Table 3 show that the long-run GDP increase under Scenario
1b is only around 10% of what is realised when all households improve
their energy eﬃciency.
Comparison of the results in scenarios 1a and 1b reported in Table 4
show that residential energy use in the lowest household income group
falls most, as does the share of consumption spending on this energy
use, when the eﬃciency improvement is targeted only in HG1. This is
because the rebound in energy use is smaller where there is a more
limited boost to household income. However, Table 3 has shown that
the total reduction in UK households and economy-wide energy use is
smaller (i.e. rebound is larger) under Scenario 1b when the eﬃciency
improvement is limited to HG1. This is because the other households do
not experience an improvement in eﬃciency and slightly increase their
energy consumption with the (very limited) economic expansion.
The conclusion that can be drawn is that more extensive energy
eﬃciency stimuli can deliver a fuller set of desired outcomes. This in-
cludes achieving reductions in energy use through energy eﬃciency
and (by implication from reduced energy use) carbon reduction targets,
boosting household income in low (and other) income households,
along with wider economic expansion. However, so far we have not
given any consideration to how increased energy eﬃciency may be
funded. Therefore, in the next section, we report on extended simula-
tions where we incorporate a basic consideration of the impacts of
applying some treatment of cost via the public budget.
6.2. Basic options for funding improvements in household energy eﬃciency
via the Government budget
6.2.1. Scenarios 2a and 2b. Funding increase in residential energy use via
Government spending reallocation
According to the relation in (6), as residential energy eﬃciency
increase, government spending falls in order to keep the ﬁscal deﬁcit
constant.23 This causes a short run contraction in economic activity
(reﬂected in the GDP results over time in Fig. 3). The contraction in
activity actually continues for less than the assumed 5-year period of
required reallocation of government expenditure. This is because ﬁrms
are forward looking (i.e. they know that the contraction in spending
will end) and they adjust their investment plans accordingly.
At the level of the diﬀerent household income groups, in Scenario
2a, where all households improve their energy eﬃciency, the short-run
impact is a slightly smaller boost to consumption (disposable income
net of savings) but with the gap relative to the ‘no cost’ Scenario 1a
being larger in higher income groups where labour and capital incomes
are more important. In Scenario 2b, where energy eﬃciency only in-
creases in the lowest income quintile, the impact for HG1 remains more
or less unchanged relative to Scenario 1b. However, all other groups
now experience a slight contraction in their income used for con-
sumption (−0–01% in HG2 & 3 and −0.02% in HG4 & 5).
The key ﬁnding, however, is that the long-run results under
Scenarios 2a and 2b are unchanged relative to the costless case in
Scenarios 1a and 1b. This is because the spending necessary to deliver
the energy eﬃciency improvement is temporary, but the eﬃciency gain
is permanent. At the end of the payment, essentially the conditions
existing at period 1 of the costless case are restored and the only per-
sisting disturbance is the increase in residential energy use.
6.2.2. Scenarios 3a and 3b. Funding increase in residential energy use via
increased income tax rate
In this case there are more marked changes in the nature of the
results. First, as noted in Section 5, the change in income tax brings
about a change in the supply side of the economy. This is because the
increase in taxation reduces the take home wage, causing workers to
demand higher salaries according to Eq. (4), putting upward pressure
on the real wage and thereby impacting costs faced by all ﬁrms. While
Fig. 3 shows a very close convergence in long-run GDP under Scenario
3a, there are some minor diﬀerences in the long-run impacts on GDP,
investment and employment/unemployment. This is because the in-
come tax remains endogenous while government expenditure is ﬁxed,
whereas in Scenarios 1 and 2 the income tax rate is ﬁxed and govern-
ment expenditure is endogenous.
However, there is a greater impact on results when the energy ef-
ﬁciency improvement is limited to HG1 in Scenario 3b. First, Fig. 4
shows that there is a small contraction in GDP that lasts into the long
run (−0.005%). This implies that the increase in energy eﬃciency in
HG1 does not provide a suﬃcient economic stimulus to demand to
deliver a long-run expansion in the presence of the adverse supply-side
shock that is delivered via the induced rise in wage demands.24
Moreover, while the impact on income used for consumption is very
similar in Scenario 3b (as compared to 3a) under the government
spending and tax options for HG1 (only slightly worse under the latter),
it is very diﬀerent for all the other household income groups. Initially,
given that they pay more income tax, HG2-5, eﬀectively pay for the
increase in HG1 energy eﬃciency through their increased tax con-
tributions. However, over time, even once the tax rate reduces again,
Table 4
Percentage change in household income and energy expenditure in Scenarios 1a and b.
HG1 HG2 HG3 HG4 HG5
SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR
Scenario 1a
Disposable income (excluding savings) 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.63 0.54 0.60 0.51 0.60 0.43 0.52
Residential energy consumption −1.99 −2.31 −2.19 −2.49 −2.34 −2.61 −2.44 −2.68 −2.61 −2.86
Share of income spent on res. energy −2.67 −2.99 −2.78 −3.10 −2.87 −3.19 −2.93 −3.26 −3.03 −3.36
Household rebound in residential energy 80.11 76.85 78.07 75.08 76.59 73.87 75.61 73.24 73.90 71.43
HG1 HG2 HG3 HG4 HG5
SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR
Scenario 1b
Disposable income (excluding savings) 0.60 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Residential energy consumption −2.41 −2.45 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03
Share of income spent on res. energy −3.00 −3.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
Household rebound in residential energy 75.86 75.47 – – – – – – – –
23 The long run results under Scenarios 2 and 3 are generally not very diﬀerent to what
is observed in Scenario 1 so we do not provide equivalent tables here (although they are
available in Figus et al. (2016)). Accordingly, we only focus on key results in the ﬁgures
below.
24 However, again, we ﬁnd that if any other household group is the sole beneﬁciary of
the energy eﬃciency improvement, the resulting stimulus is suﬃcient to deliver a net
expansion in GDP, and that this is more so the higher the income level of the group in
question.
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the other groups continue to pay through the greater impact on their
disposable (net of savings) incomes from the economic contraction.
This is shown in Fig. 5. Note that the biggest ‘loser’ is the highest in-
come quintile, HG5. This is due to the fact that income from ownership
of capital (most important in HG5) is adversely aﬀected in this scenario
due to more limited investment activity.
We have run a speciﬁc sensitivity scenario where we increase the
size of the energy eﬃciency improvement in HG1 to see what is re-
quired to produce a positive GDP result over the long-run under the
income tax funding scenario. We ﬁnd that a 12% boost to residential
energy use in HG1 is suﬃcient to deliver a net positive (0.0003%) in-
crease in GDP over the long run, with the positive result emerging from
period 11. However, the net negative impact on disposable income in
the other household groups persists, albeit to a lesser extent. We ﬁnd
that, where we have an income tax funding arrangement as above, a
doubling of the eﬃciency improvement in HG1 residential energy use
to 20% is required to remove the long-run negative impacts on the
disposable income of all other groups. Below this, the highest income
households remain the most aﬀected, for example with only HG5 losing
out over the long run where the eﬃciency improvement in HG1 is 19%.
Overall, the results above suggest that imposing a cost for increasing
energy eﬃciency via the public budget will constrain the ‘multiple
beneﬁts’ of increased energy eﬃciency at least in the shorter run.
However, if the economic expansion is suﬃciently big, the long-run
outcome is one of net gain in broader economic impacts. When the
eﬃciency improvement is targeted only in the lowest income house-
holds this does deliver the desired outcomes for that group, but it
weakens the economic expansion, while the need for (and nature of)
public funding through the government budget becomes much more
important.
7. Conclusions and policy implications
Many recent economic modelling studies of increased energy eﬃ-
ciency have tended to focus on the issue of rebound eﬀects. However, in
considering economy-wide rebound in particular, some studies have
identiﬁed economic expansion resulting from increased energy eﬃ-
ciency as the driver of rebound, a ﬁnding that is consistent with the
type of ‘Multiple Beneﬁts’ argument proposed by the IEA (2014). Here,
we have focused our attention on how the economic expansion may
provide a justiﬁcation for public/government support of energy eﬃ-
ciency programmes.
Speciﬁcally, we have used an illustrative CGE modelling analysis for
the UK to consider the general eﬀects of government support of do-
mestic energy eﬃciency programmes. We have raised the question of
whether only low income households should be aided in improving
their energy eﬃciency, or whether there is suﬃcient return through
expansion to justify potentially supporting wider ranging programmes.
A key point that we have raised is that many governments are com-
mitted to the support of energy eﬃciency programmes but may focus
this in low income households. However, Governments tend to have a
wider set of desired outcomes, including reduced energy use and carbon
emissions, but also in terms of reducing poverty (including but not
limited to energy poverty) and increasing economic well-being, in part
through GDP and employment growth.
In considering scenarios where support is provided only for the
lowest income households to increase their energy eﬃciency, our
ﬁndings suggest that it is likely to be diﬃcult to meet all of govern-
ment's objectives simultaneously through limited support of households
that are signiﬁcantly less connected to the wider economy than others
(in terms of their level of spending and their sources of income). Our
own results suggest that in order to stimulate economic activity by this
route quite large proportionate increases in residential energy
Fig. 4. Period by period % change in GDP from a 10% in-
crease in residential energy eﬃciency in household quintile 1.
Fig. 3. Period by period % change in GDP from a 10% in-
crease in residential energy eﬃciency in all households.
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eﬃciency in low income household need to be achieved. In contrast,
where the introduction of increased energy eﬃciency is spread over all
(or at least a wider range) of households, even where there is a cost to
supporting energy eﬃciency improvements, the return via the impacts
of economic expansion is likely to provide what justiﬁcation for sup-
port.
However, our ﬁndings suggest that the means of providing support
for energy eﬃciency programmes should be carefully considered and
examined. Our results imply that a reallocation of government spending
will be less distortive than requiring the household sector to pay in-
directly (according to ability to pay) via income tax. However, we re-
serve fuller consideration of speciﬁc funding mechanisms for future
research, ideally in consultation with policy decision makers particu-
larly within the UK.
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Fig. 5. Short-run and long-run % change in disposable in-
come from a 10% increase in residential energy eﬃciency in
household quintile 1 funded via an increase in income tax.
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